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Abstract 
Governance has many dimensions - corporate governance pertains to the firm’s management 
whilst sovereign governance pertains to the firm’s exposure to sovereign risk, corruption, and poor 
regulation. We show that both are important drivers of firm value and this has serious implications for the 
increasing number of Chinese firms choosing to cross-list in the US. Whilst the legal bonding hypothesis 
argues that firms from poor-corporate-governance environments can signal their quality by issuing stock 
in the US it is silent on the role of sovereign governance. Thus, we use a sample of cross-listed firms from 
48 countries between 1996 and 2008 and find that the home country’s sovereign governance quality, but 
not its corporate governance quality (as proxied by the anti-director rights index) continue to influence the 
market values of cross-listed firms. Furthermore, cross-listed firms from strong governance countries that 
have higher market values than non-cross-listed firms or firms from weak governance countries. These 
results highlight the importance of distinguishing between the myriad types of governance when 
analyzing the bonding hypothesis and the drivers of cross-listed stocks’ valuations, and emphasize the 
continued importance of sovereign governance for cross-listed firms.  
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1 Introduction 
In the cross-listing literature, there exists two apparently conflicting hypotheses – the 
bonding and the market segmentation hypotheses (Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999; Licht, 2003; 
Siegel, 2009;Miller, 1999). The bonding hypothesis argues that firms intentionally cross-list on 
markets that have more stringent legal and regulatory requirements than the firm’s home market 
to limit the private benefits of control and to signal their quality. This ‘bonding’ effect forces the 
company to raise its corporate governance and disclosure levels to (at least) the bare minimum 
required for a foreign listing. This induces a bonding premium and hence, higher valuations.1 On 
the other hand, the market segmentation hypothesis postulates that higher firm valuations from 
cross-listings come about as firms’ costs of capital are reduced when they help investors to 
overcome the barriers to international investments.  Accordingly, the valuation gain depends on 
the degree to which the cross-listed firm’s home market is integrated with world capital markets. 
In support of this view, Miller (1999) uncovered significantly higher announcement returns for 
the U.S cross-listings of firms from emerging than developed markets.   
The legal bonding hypothesis implies that firms can ameliorate weak-governance in the 
home country by cross-listing in the US to adopt US disclosure rules to signal their true quality 
to potential investors. The segmentation hypothesis implies that weak-governance in the home 
country should still harm cross-listed stocks due, inter alia to the firm’s continued exposure to 
sovereign risk and any residual home-asset bias. We show that the ‘segmented market 
hypothesis’ and the ‘bonding hypothesis’ are in fact compatible because they relate to different 
dimensions of home-country governance. The bonding hypothesis relates specifically to 
shareholder protection type of ‘corporate governance’ traits such as shareholder protection. The 
segmented (or separated) market hypothesis relates to (inter alia) ‘sovereign governance’ traits 
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such as regulation, corruption, and government effectiveness. We show that cross-listing in the 
United States can help firms overcome a poor shareholder-governance environment. However, 
cross-listing does not eliminate the effect of poor sovereign-governance.  
This paper considers the continued impact of home country governance quality on two 
levels -  shareholder-governance and sovereign-governance on non-US firms that cross-list in the 
US. This paper examines a sample of 1334 non-US firms from 48 countries that list in the US 
between 1996 and 2008, for a total of 7780 firm-year observations. We also compare the set of 
cross-listed companies to a set of non-cross-listed companies to examine the valuation impact of 
cross-listing on companies from strong/weak governance countries.  We measure sovereign-
governance using (a) the ICRG composite risk index, (b) a rating agency’s sovereign credit 
ratings, and (c) the World Bank’s comprehensive set of time-varying country-level governance 
indices that include, inter alia, government accountability, political stability, the absence of 
corruption, enforcement of the rule of law, and the effectiveness of political institutions (Daniel 
et al., 2009). These traits increase corporate governance and disclosure, and encourage political 
development (La Porta et al., 1998, 2002). We measure shareholder-governance using the anti-
director rights index (ADRI) reported in Spamann (2010).  
Our key finding is that sovereign-governance but not shareholder-governance influences 
the US values of foreign cross-listed firms. First, we show that the ADRI does not significantly 
influence cross-listed firms’ Tobin’s Qs. Second, we find that even after controlling for selection 
effects,  cross-listed firms in the top quartile (of the World Bank Governance Index) have 
Tobin’s Q values that are approximately 0.25 higher than those from countries in the bottom 
quartile countries. Third, we find that (a) cross-listed firms from strong governance countries 
have higher Tobin’s Q values than non-cross-listed firms from strong governance countries, and 
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(b) cross-listed firms from strong governance countries have higher Tobin’s Qs than cross-listed 
firms from weak governance countries.    
The main contributions of our study are four-fold: First, we highlight the importance of 
considering multiple aspects of home-country governance as some hypotheses, such as the 
bonding hypothesis, are simply not applicable to all types of governance. We show that while 
home-country shareholder protection does not significantly influence the valuations of cross-
listed firms, home-country sovereign governance does influence valuations. Importantly, firms 
from strong-governance countries that cross-list have higher valuations than cross-listed firms 
from weak-governance countries, or non-cross-listed firms from strong governance countries. 
Second, by using a comprehensive set of governance indicators that reflect the time-varying 
dimensions of governance and which capture the impact of regulatory changes, our results 
suggest that home-country regulation and governance is more important to firms’ cross-listed 
stocks in the US than has been previously reported in the literature. Moreover, we show the 
importance of the time-varying World Bank governance measures as opposed to legal measures 
proxied by indices capturing elements of shareholder protection like anti-director rights. Third, 
we also highlight the importance of sovereign credit risk by examining the relation between 
sovereign credit ratings and the valuations of cross-listed firms. This is an important contribution 
given the recent deteriorations in fiscal soundness for many developed countries around the 
world. Fourth, a collateral finding is that the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) has not benefited all 
cross-listed firms; for firms from strong-governance countries, SOX appears to have increased 
costly disclosure requirements and appears to have reduced firm values.  
Our analyses support three main lines of prior work that have shown there are likely to be 
greater benefits to listing in the US for firms based in strong regulation countries. First, the study 
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relates to the `bonding hypothesis’. The hypothesis is that firms from weak shareholder-rights 
environments can signal their quality by bonding themselves to stringent US shareholder 
protection laws. Doidge et al. (2004, 2009a) find empirical support for this hypothesis. They 
focus on the La Porta et al. (1997) anti-director rights index but do not focus on sovereign risk 
and governance.2 Further, Shi et al. (2012) find that U.S. cross-listings enhance corporations’ 
voluntary disclosures. We support this literature by showing that the anti-director rights index 
(ADRI) does not influence the US market values of non-US firms listed in the United States.  
 Second, the separated markets hypothesis implies that home-country sovereign-
governance should still influence valuations. Here, geographic distances and information 
asymmetries make it difficult for US investors to evaluate companies outside of the US (Ahearne 
et al., 2004; Portes and Rey, 2005; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2011). This might be particularly so for 
companies domiciled in poor governance countries where there might be limited enforcement of 
disclosure laws. Further, non-US firms are still exposed to sovereign risks, such as the risk of 
expropriation. This implies that home-country sovereign-governance should influence the 
valuations of non-US firms that are listed in the US. There is some supportive evidence, with 
Gozzi et al (2010) finding that performance changes following international debt/equity 
issuances are largely similar to those following domestic issuances, possibly suggesting that the 
home market continues to influence the benefits derived from accessing international markets. 
Similarly, di Giovanni (2005) shows that domestic conditions can drive corporate cross-border 
investment. However, the prior literature has not directly tested whether sovereign governance 
continues to drive the valuations of cross-listed stocks.3    
There are important implications of our research for firms striving to cross-list in US 
markets. For instance, the continual access to global equity financing for Chinese firms is 
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paramount for supporting China’s economic growth and ultimately, stability in the global 
economy. There are many Chinese firms that intentionally cross-list in foreign markets in order 
to bond to high investor protection and strict disclosure regulation, access international capital 
markets and to enhance investor’s recognition of their company and products. We reveal that 
firms cross-listed in the United States (US) are worth more to shareholders if they come from 
countries with stronger governance standards. That is, it is not the mere bonding to tighter US 
regulations that helps to increase shareholder wealth but the home-grown ability to support those 
requirements that matter. Given the increasing number of Chinese companies that are cross-listed 
on international stock exchanges, it is important for the Chinese government to also improve its 
sovereign governance to support its ongoing financial and economic development.  
The reminder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines why home-
country governance might influence the U.S. valuations of firms that cross-list in the U.S. 
Thereafter we outline the data under analysis. The empirical analyses first test the relation 
between governance and value. We then provide a number of robustness checks. The last section 
concludes that strong home-country governance remains important even for firms that list in the 
US. 
2 Hypotheses: the importance of home-country governance 
2.1 Sovereign governance 
This section addresses why home-country sovereign-governance is likely to influence the 
valuations of firms that cross-list in the U.S. (even if firms can ameliorate the impact of poor 
home-country shareholder-governance). We provide four possible explanations. First, cross-
listing should be less costly for firms from strong-governance countries.4 The U.S. is typically 
considered to have relatively strong accounting and compliance requirements. Compliance is 
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costly (Doidge et al., 2009b). The costs of U.S. compliance should be lower for firms that must 
already comply with stringent disclosure regimes in the home country. Thus, the costs of cross-
listing should be lower for firms from strong-governance countries. Lower costs could partially 
explain higher market values for firms from strong-governance countries. In addition, we also 
expect that the cross-listing firms from strong governance countries, which enjoy the benefits of 
both the bonding premium and the low costs of compliance, would be more valuable to 
shareholders than non-cross-listed firms.  
 Second, home-asset bias might favour companies from strong-governance countries. The 
literature documents a ‘home-asset bias’ in U.S. investors (Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; Coval 
and Moskowitz, 1999; Glassman and Riddick, 2001). Three presently relevant explanations are 
that (1) home assets have a lower perceived riskiness (Glassman and Riddick, 2001), (2) home 
assets have less asymmetric information (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999), and (3) theoretical 
models indicate that trade should tend toward the market with lower asymmetric information and 
greater liquidity (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991), which for firms from poor-governance markets 
would be the U.S. This should favour firms from strong-governance countries for they should 
have lower perceived risk and better information disclosure. Thus, to the extent that price-
discovery occurs on the U.S. market,5 firms from strong-governance countries should experience 
higher market values.  
 Third, sovereign governance can influence a firm’s investment opportunities. 
Dharmapala and Khanna (2013) show that a firm’s country determines its growth options. While 
it is true that large multinationals can expand overseas, such expansions are generally more 
costly and risky than expanding within the home country (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). 
Sovereign governance can influence growth opportunities by affecting factors such as a firm’s 
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access to capital and the level of entrepreneurship (Cumming and Knill, 2012). Thus, we would 
expect the governance of the firm’s home country to continue to influence its returns after it 
cross lists. Further, to the extent that firms within strong governance countries have a greater 
opportunity set, we expect that cross-listing will be more beneficial for such companies because 
they will have more possible investments on which to spend the money raised through cross-
listing. Consistent with these expectations, McGahan and Victer (2010) find that home country 
factors continue to influence corporate profitability even in multinationals (although they do not 
specifically examine cross-listed firms).  
Fourth, non-U.S. companies from weak governance regimes are still exposed to sovereign 
risks. This might discourage investors and drive down valuations. These companies are also 
subject to the impact of that weak-sovereign-governance on financing terms. Even if a firm 
cross-lists in the United States, it might still need to raise capital from other sources, such as 
from lenders. However, the sovereign legal environment affects the terms on which the firm can 
raise that capital. For example, Qi et al. (2011) find that covenants are less common in countries 
that better enforce the rule of law. Further, Hainz and Kleimeier (2012) find that political risk 
significantly influences the way in which firms conduct project financing. There is also prior 
evidence that the presence of strong laws, and the enforcement thereof, significantly influences 
market quality (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002, 2009; Bhattacharya et al., 2003), and, by 
implication, access to capital. The U.S. listing would not mitigate the impact of (poor) 
enforcement of the rule of law in the home country. This implies that firms from stronger 
governance countries should have higher valuations than those from weak governance countries. 
We hereby propose two hypotheses as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1: Home country governance influences the valuations of cross-listed companies - 
firms from strong-governance countries have higher valuations than firms from weak governance 
countries.  
Hypothesis 2: The benefits of cross-listing are higher for firms from strong governance countries 
- cross-listed firms from strong governance countries have higher valuations than non-cross-
listed firms and cross-listed firms from weak governance countries.  
 
2.2 Shareholder-governance 
We also argue that home-country shareholder-rights and shareholder-governance do not 
influence the market values of non-US firms that list in the US. This is because cross-listed firms 
from countries with weak investor protection simply “badge” themselves by adhering to investor 
protection  and disclosure regulations in developed markets like the US (consistent with the 
“reputational bonding hypothesis”), but the quality of their financial reporting/disclosure remains 
lower in that home country governance doesn’t support strong enforcement of increasingly 
demanding regulations. Therefore, shareholder rights do not make a big difference on the 
valuation of cross-listed firms. This is consistent with the evidence on Chinese reverse mergers 
which are the acquisitions of private companies made by public companies. Around 75% of the 
215 Chinese firms listed in the US between 2007 and 2010 adopted a reverse merger (RM), 
representing 26% of all RM during that period. However, a number of Chinese RM firms have 
faced accusations of accounting fraud since 2010 and indeed, Chen et al. (2012) uncover lower 
accounting quality in Chinese RM firms than in both US RM and regular firms. Therefore, we 
predict that home-country shareholder rights do not influence the valuations of cross-listed 
companies.  
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 3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Empirical strategy 
Our first set of models examines how sovereign governance influences the valuation of cross-
listed companies. The sample is a firm-year panel of observations for cross-listed firms. The 
reason for choosing a firm-year panel, rather than examining short-term changes in Tobin’s Q in 
the immediate years after cross-listing, is as follows: Some prior literature indicates that the main 
valuation-gains from cross-listing are short-term (Gozzi et al., 2008; Sarkissian and Schill, 
2009). If we were to focus only on the change in Tobin’s Q immediate after cross-listing, then 
there would be the concern that the results merely reflect a short-term bounce in Tobin’s Q. 
Examining a firm-year panel allows us to examine Tobin’s Q at any time after cross-listing, 
thereby ameliorating concerns about short-term increases in Tobin’s Q. Our models are of the 
following form:  
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽GOV𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐼(SOX)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃�GOV𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐼(SOX)𝑖,𝑡� + �𝜓(𝑘)Control𝑖,𝑡(𝑘)𝑛
𝑘=1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
where, 𝑄𝑖𝑡  is firm 𝑖 ’s Tobin’s Q in year 𝑡 , GOV𝑖,𝑡  is a measure of sovereign governance 
(described below) and 𝐼(SOX)𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator that equals to one if the observation post-dates 
SOX and zero otherwise. We also include year dummies and cluster standard errors by firm. The 
baseline specification is an OLS regression specification. This controls for clustering by firm and 
includes year dummies. By following Doidge et al. (2004), we also use a Heckman model to 
control for the non-random decision to list in the United States.  
The second set of models examines whether cross-listed companies benefit more (or less) 
from strong governance than do non-cross-listed companies. They also examine whether cross-
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listing benefits firms from strong governance countries more than it does firms from weak 
governance countries. To do this, we expand the sample to include both cross-listed companies 
and non-cross-listed companies and create an indicator for whether the firm is cross-listed (as per 
Zhang, 2007). The models are of the following form.  
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽GOV𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐼(Cross-listed)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃�GOV𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐼(Cross-listed)𝑖,𝑡�
+ �𝜓(𝑘)Control𝑖,𝑡(𝑘)𝑛
𝑘=1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(2) 
where, 𝐼�Cross-listed�
𝑖,𝑡 is the indicator that equals one if the firm is cross-listed, GOV𝑖,𝑡 is one 
of the various governance variables (described below) and 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is firm 𝑖’s Tobin’s Q in year 𝑡. We 
expect a positive (significant) coefficient on the interaction term, suggesting that firms from 
strong-governance countries benefit more from cross-listing than do firms from weak-
governance countries.  
3.2 Data source 
Our sample used in the test of Hypothesis 1 comprises non-US firms listed on a US 
exchange between 1996 and 2008. For the cross-listed firms, data on firm-values comes from 
CRSP/Compustat. Their firm-level accounting data comes from Compustat. We only examine 
cross-listed firms because we want to examine the continuing impact of sovereign governance 
given that a firm has decided to bond itself to the US market. There are 1,334 unique firms for a 
total of 7,780 firm-year observations. The sample size reduces to 5,642 observations if we 
require that Spamann (2010) report an anti-director rights (ADRI) value for that home-country. 
To test Hypothesis 2, in addition to the 5642 cross-listed companies we also obtain 56,552 non-
cross-listed observations, which subsequently reduces to 48,890 in the regressions due to the 
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missing value of the control variables. For the non-cross-listed companies, we obtain all market-
value data and corporate-level data from Compustat Global.  
Data on sovereign-governance comes from the World Bank and independent data 
providers Political Risk Services (PRS) Group and Standard and Poors. The World Bank does 
not report data for 1997, 1999, and 2001. For these years, we backfill data from the previous year 
(consistent with Gompers et al., 2003; Masulis et al., 2007; Bebchuk et al., 2009). The sample 
excludes firms that lack the required CRSP return data, or Compustat company-level data. The 
variables come in five main categories. Table 1 provides definitions of all the variables used. The 
following sub-sections provide a detailed description.  
-- Insert Table 1 About Here -- 
 
3.3 Valuation Variables 
The measure of market value is the firm's Tobin's Q (following Lang et al., 1989; Doidge 
et al., 2004; Bebchuk et al., 2009). The Tobin's Q is the market value of assets divided by the 
book value of assets. The market value of assets is the firm's market capitalization at the end of 
the fiscal year plus its book value of assets less its book value of equity.  
3.4 Governance Variables 
The key independent variables are the set of governance variables. Our goal is to examine 
factors other than mere corporate law (as would be captured in the ADRI variables). Thus, we 
focus on measures of regulation and stability. These are from the World Bank, ICRG, and S&P 
and are discussed below. We also include the ADRI variable as a control (see below). 
World Bank Governance Variables: We use a comprehensive set of governance 
variables sourced from the World Bank.6 The World Bank measures and ranks the governance 
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dimensions of government's accountability, corruption, government effectiveness, political 
stability, regulatory effectiveness, and the rule of law. The standardized ‘rank’ variable ranks 
countries from 0 to 100 (where 100 marks good governance and 0 marks poor governance). We 
convert this into a percentage rank between 0 and 1 (by dividing by 100). Similar to Butler and 
Fauver (2006), we then compute a composite governance index (denoted ‘GovIndex’), which is 
an equally weighted average of all six governance variables. This process induces seven 
governance variables: government accountability (denoted WB Accountability), corruption (WB 
Corruption), government effectiveness (WB Gov Effectiveness), political stability (WB Pol 
Stability), regulation (WB Regulation), rule of law enforcement (WB Rule of Law), and an 
equally weighted average of all six governance variables (WB Gov Index). In all cases, a higher 
number represents better quality governance. All variables are bound between 0 and 1. 
S&P Sovereign Credit Ratings: We include Standard and Poor’s sovereign credit rating. 
This rating assesses a government’s ability to repay existing debt. A strong rating suggests strong 
macro-prudential regulation.  Subsequently, there is an implicit sovereign ceiling provided by 
government’s sovereign rating and as such, poor sovereign credit ratings may lead to high costs 
of borrowing for firms and hence, lower their stock performance. Furthermore, for some cross-
listed firms that are of national significance, sovereign credit ratings reflect the implicit ability of 
their national government to provide bailouts for investors.  
ICRG Variables: It is important to ensure the results are robust to alternative governance 
measures.  An alternative source of governance data are provided by the PRS Group in their 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) risk ratings.7 The robustness analysis focuses on the 
ICRG's composite index of political, financial, and economic risks and examine whether firms 
from strong ICRG-governance countries have higher valuations.   
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3.5 Shareholder-governance variables 
Shareholder governance is different from sovereign governance. The shareholder 
governance variables capture legal protection for minority shareholders. These might be, but not 
necessarily, correlated with the strength of the country’s regulatory regime. 
We use the anti-director rights index (ADRI) to proxy for shareholder-governance. La 
Porta et al (1997, 1998) proposed the ADRI. Spamann (2010) updated and corrected the ADRI. 
We use the Spamann (2010)  ADRI, denoted ‘ADRI (Spamann)’. Because Spamann (2010) does 
not report data for all countries in the sample, the sample size in the main non-Heckman 
regressions reduces to 5642 observations.  We considered a variety of other variables, and the 
main results reported below are robust.8  
3.6 Control Variables 
The models include five key firm-specific variables. First, ‘IAOP’ is the firm’s industry 
adjusted operating performance. A firm's operating performance is its operating cash flow scaled 
by its total assets. The industry-adjusted operating performance is the firm's operating 
performance less the average operating performance in that year of all other companies in the 
firm's SIC 4-digit industry. 9 Second, ‘ln(Assets) is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. This 
addresses the finding in Moeller et al (2004) that the managers of large firms are entrenched and 
are more likely to make value-destroying investments (in their sample, takeovers). Third, ‘DPS’ 
is the firm’s dividends per share. A high dividend payout ratio may signal that the firm has 
sufficient free cash to distribute to shareholders (Ravid and Sarig, 1991). This suggests a positive 
relation between valuations and DPS. Alternatively, it may signal a lack of profitable investment 
opportunities, or may merely reflect dividend smoothing policies (Gugler, 2003). This implies a 
negative relation between valuations and DPS. Fourth, ‘Cash/Assets’ is the firm’s cash holding 
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scaled by its total assets. This addresses the possibility of Jensen (1986) and Harford (1999)  type 
agency conflicts. These would reduce valuations. Fifth, ‘Debt/Assets’ is the firm’s long term 
debt scaled by its total assets. This controls for the role of leverage in reducing Jensen (1986) 
type agency conflicts of free cash flow. Thus, leverage should increase valuations. Sixth, ‘SOX’ 
is an indicator that equals one if the observation post-dates the implementation of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act (in 2002). We control for this due to the finding SOX imposes some additional costs 
upon firms and its implementation caused declines in the values of non-US companies cross-
listed in the US (Zhang, 2007). 
3.7 Country-based controls 
We explicitly control for eight home-country variables that may determine a cross-listed 
firm’s value. The first seven derive from the World Bank's World Development Indicators 
(WDI) and Global Development Finance (GDF) databases.  
‘Home Region Stock Return’, is the equally weighted stock return for all stocks 
domiciled in the firm’s home ‘region’. 10 We refer to a home region rather than a home country 
in order to (a) avoid biases due to illiquidity in small markets and (b) to account for the regional 
cross-linkages noted in Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005). ‘CPI’ is the CPI inflation of the firm's 
home market. Fama and Schwert (1977) and Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) find that 
inflation, as a proxy for economic growth, can predict stock returns. ‘Trade Imbalance’ is the 
home-country’s trade-imbalance, defined as (imports-exports)/(imports+exports). This addresses 
the possibility that a trade imbalance might depress the home-country exchange rate (Feldstein, 
2008). This might then influence the firm's operating environment and tax exposure, which in 
turn might influence its profitability (Dharmapala and Riedel, 2012; Dharmapala and Desai, 
2011).  
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‘FDI/GDP’ is the home country’s foreign direct investment (FDI) divided by its GDP. 
This addresses the relationship between FDI and economic development in the home country 
(Borensztein et al., 1998). ‘Home Market Cap/GDP’ is the total market capitalization of firms 
listed in the home-country scaled by the home country’s GDP. This controls for the relationship 
between market development, FDI use, and access to capital. ‘Home Market Turnover’ is the 
turnover of the home-country’s stock market. This controls for the possibility that a liquid home 
market could reduce the average cost of capital for firms domiciled in that market (following 
Butler et al., 2005), which might increase firm value. ‘Home Cop Tax Rate’ is the highest 
marginal corporate tax rate in the home market. High home country corporate taxes might reduce 
firm value if they discourage FDI (following di Giovanni, 2005). This could reduce growth. 
Additionally, high taxes reduce after tax profits, which in turn reduce firm value. Alternatively, 
countries which use taxes productively might be able to use tax income to stimulate economic 
growth and in turn increase valuations. Also, to the extent that high taxes might discourage 
international investors, listing in the US might increase the firm's access to capital and improve 
firm value.  
3.8 Heckman Choice Variables 
The Heckman model accounts for the non-random decision to cross-list in the U.S. The 
rationale is that the companies that cross-list could be larger, more stable, and generally more 
capable to comply with disclosure requirements, and thus, might be better governed in general 
(Huang, 2011).  The Heckman model works by modeling the decision to issue equity in the 
United States. Thus, the sample-of-interest is the set of non-U.S. firms that issue equity in the 
U.S. The control sample is the set of all non-U.S. firms that issue equity in any other market in 
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the world. Unless otherwise mentioned, these variables date from before the firm issues equity 
on the stock market because they must influence the initial public offering (IPO) decision.  
The choice variables are in several categories. First, we control for the Spamann (2010) 
ADRI index, and the value of the various governance variables at the time of the IPO. This 
reflects the possibility that companies from strong-governance countries are less likely to need to 
raise capital in the United States and are less likely to seek a certification benefit (if any) from 
subjecting themselves to U.S. regulations.  
Second, we control for home country variables that reflect the local business environment 
and state of financial development including the home-region return, the home country’s trade 
imbalance, FDI/GDP, Market Capitalization scaled by GDP, stock market turnover, and 
maximum corporate tax rate. Similarly to home governance variables, these address the 
possibility that firms in economically strong countries are less likely to need to raise capital 
overseas, so are less likely to list in the U.S.  
Third, we control for listing-process variables including the use of a fixed-price pricing 
mechanism, and the use of firm-commitment underwriting. This is because the desire (or ability) 
to use a different listing process might influence the desire to list in the U.S. For example, if the 
firm wishes to use an auction pricing mechanism, rather than a book-building mechanism, it 
might instead seek capital in Europe rather than in the United States.  
Fourth, we use firm-level variables including the natural log of assets, whether the firm is 
venture-capital (VC) backed, and whether the firm is a high-tech firm as defined in Loughran 
and Ritter (2004).11 High-tech firms and VC backed firms might prefer to issue equity in the 
United States because the U.S. hosts many technologically developed corporations. Conversely, 
large firms might prefer U.S. listings (over home-market listings) because their large size enables 
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them to sustain the cost of a cross-listing and is the only means for them to raise sufficient capital 
for their large scale investments. 
The choice variables are these that do not feature in the main (i.e. second stage) 
regressions and should satisfy the exclusion restriction. They include variables associated with 
the listing in the US and corporate variables from the time of the listing (i.e. before the second 
stage model). These choice variables are likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction on grounds that 
they are from the time of listing whereas the Tobin’s Q is from well after the listing. Further, the 
listing-process variables should only influence the nature of the listing, and should not influence 
long-term valuations.  
4 Results and Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Univariate Tests 
Table 2 contains the sample composition by year. The pattern of observations is broadly 
consistent with the existing literature (Karolyi, 2006). Columns 3-14 of Table 2 contain the 
average values of the various governance variables for each year. The table reveals a slight 
decline, in the average country-level governance of non-US firms over time. This may suggest an 
increased willingness of firms in economically strong, but legally developing, countries to list in 
the US, and highlights the importance of allowing governance variables to change over time (in 
contrast to previous studies such as Doidge et al., 2004; Chung, 2006). Table 3 provides 
summary statistics for Tobin`s Q and governance by countries. Cross-listings to the US from 
English legal origin countries tend to have higher Tobin`s Q.   
-- Table 2 About Here -- 
-- Table 3 About Here -- 
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Table 4 provides a comparison of the firms from poor (bottom quartile) governance 
countries and firms from the good (top quartile) governance countries.  Column 1 contains 
results for all non-US firms in the sample. Column 2 focuses on firms from bad governance 
countries, defined as countries whose WB Gov Index score for a given year is in the bottom 25% 
of the sample. Column 3 examines firms from good governance countries, whose WB Gov Index 
score for a given year is in the top 75% of the sample.  The results in Table 4 support the 
prediction that firms from good governance countries perform better than do those from bad 
governance countries. Table 4 indicates that the median Tobin's Q for firms from good 
governance countries is significantly higher than that for firms from poor governance countries.  
-- Table 4 About Here – 
Focusing on the governance variables (accountability, corruption, effectiveness, stability, 
regulation, law and the WB Gov Index), we note that most firms that list in the US come from 
relatively strong-governance countries, with the mean and median rankings typically being above 
0.8. This implies that firms from especially poor governance countries tend to avoid listing in the 
US. Speculative reasons for this might be that such firms are smaller, less-liquid, or simply do 
not wish to subject themselves to stringent US regulatory standards (following Doidge et al., 
2004). 
The control variables differ significantly between firms from good governance and poor 
governance countries. All control variables (and differences therein) are significant at the 1% 
significance level. They show that poor governance countries tend to have higher inflation. Firms 
from poor governance countries also tend to be smaller (have lower total assets), pay lower 
dividends, and maintain less leverage. Conversely, they maintain higher cash holdings. 
Interestingly, they tend to have higher industry-adjusted operating performance. The cash-
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holdings and dividends results are largely consistent with those reported in Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson (2003, 2007). This suggests that if a company is from a poor governance country, 
then it will list abroad only if its performance is especially strong.  
Table 5 contains sample means for the Tobin’s Q variable and the governance variables 
by whether the firm is cross-listed or not. Cross-listed firms tend to have higher Tobin’s Q values 
and come from stronger governance countries. 
-- Insert Table 5 About Here – 
Table 6 contains the bivariate statistics depending on whether the firm is cross-listed or 
from a strong/weak governance country. The figures indicate that (a) Tobin’s Q values are higher 
for firms from strong governance countries, (b) Tobin’s Q values are higher for firms that cross-
list, and (c) Tobin’s Q values are higher if the cross-listed firm is from a strong-governance 
country, and if the firm in a strong-governance country cross-lists.  
-- Insert Table 6 About Here – 
  
4.2  Governance and the Tobin’s Q of cross-listed firms 
The first key empirical issue that we examine is whether firms from strong-governance countries 
have higher market values, controlling for other firm and country characteristics. We run 
equation (1) using both OLS in Table 7 and a Heckman two-stage variation in Table 8 for 
robustness checks to address the non-random decision to cross-list in the United States. 
-- Insert Table 7 About Here – 
-- Insert Table 8 About Here -- 
The multivariate results support the hypothesis that firms from good governance 
countries have higher valuations. Table 7 shows that all governance variables are significant and 
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positive at 1% significance. Furthermore, all have coefficients of 0.5 or greater, suggesting that a 
0.1 point increase in governance yields an economically important increase of at least 0.05 in 
Tobin's Q.  Table 8 presents the results after controlling for selection effects.  The data indicate 
Tobin’s Q is approximately 0.25 higher for firms that come from top quartile countries of the 
World Bank governance indices than firms that come from the bottom quartile countries, which 
is 11.8% higher relative to the average Tobin’s Q of all non-US firms in the sample.  The results 
are robust across all of the World Bank governance indicators and S&P Ratings. This suggests 
that prudent management of sovereign debt by a cross-listed firm’s home government and the 
maintenance of good governance standards can greatly benefit firm value. This presents new 
evidence on the flow-through impact of governments’ debt and regulatory management to 
individual firm valuation effects. 
Note that the Spamann (2010) anti-director rights index is statistically insignificant in all 
of our specifications in Tables 7 and 8. This implies that home-country shareholder-governance 
does not (significantly) drive the value of companies that cross-list in the US.  This implies that 
by listing in the US, non-US and binding themselves to stringent US shareholder-protection 
laws, non-US companies can ameliorate the effect of poor shareholder-governance in the home 
country. This is consistent with the bonding hypothesis.  
In addition, there is some evidence that SOX harmed firms from strong-governance 
environments consistent with the findings of Zhang (2007). In the OLS regressions, the 
interaction of the governance variable and the SOX indicator is significant and negative. This 
implies that SOX harmed market values for firms from strong governance environment, possibly 
because it increased compliance costs for firms that already had to meet adequate disclosure 
requirements. 
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The control variables in Tables 8 and 9 are largely consistent with expectations. For 
example, there is a strong negative relation between firm-size and Tobin's Q presumably because 
Tobin's Q incorporates growth prospects. Growth tends to concentrate in small high-innovation 
firms rather than in large stable firms (following Bharadwaj et al., 1999).  Cash holdings are 
found to increase Tobin's Q, suggesting that cash can increase market value. While this is 
inconsistent with the agency reason for holding cash (see Harford, 1999), it does quadrate with 
the value-enhancing precautionary reason for holding cash (Han and Qiu, 2007). This 
precautionary motive might concentrate in cross-listed or foreign firms because (a) the voluntary 
decision to undergo additional market scrutiny (by cross-listing in the US) suggests lower agency 
conflicts, and (b) cross-listed firms may have a greater need to protect against currency 
movements. Given that foreign currency movements are a key source of risk for international 
firms, this result is consistent with the finding in Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) that cash 
holdings increase with corporate risk.  
4.3 Cross-listed firms versus non-cross-listed firms  
We next run regression model (2) to test whether cross-listed firms benefit more from 
stronger sovereign governance than non-cross-listed firms. Table 9 shows that the coefficients on 
the interaction term ‘GOV𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐼�Cross-listed�𝑖,𝑡 ’ are always positive and significant in five 
regressions. This indicates companies cross-listing in the US from strong-governance countries 
have higher Tobin’s Q values, implying that cross-listed firms benefit more from strong 
sovereign governance than do non-cross-listed firms. The finding suggests that sovereign 
governance remains an important determinant of firm values after cross-listing. In addition, the 
negative coefficients on ‘ GOV𝑖,𝑡 ’ and the positive coefficients on ‘ GOV𝑖,𝑡 ×
𝐼�Cross-listed�
𝑖,𝑡 ’ suggest that compared with other firms from strong-governance countries, 
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cross-listed firms have higher Tobin’s Q values. In other words, firms from a strong governance 
country benefit from cross-listing.  
- Insert Table 9 about Here - 
 
 One concern with the main results is the possible systemic difference between cross-
listed and non-cross-listed firms. We address it by using propensity score models in the 
following way: First, we run a model to predict whether a firm is ‘cross-listed’ based on the 
control variables in the model below. Second, we obtain the propensity scores from this logit 
model. Third, we generate a distribution of propensity scores for the set of firms that are cross-
listed and identify the score that marks the bottom 10% cut-off. Fourth, we exclude any non-
cross-listed firm whose propensity score is below that cut-off. The results of propensity score 
matching presented in 10 are consistent with the main finding in Table 9 and reinforce our 
hypotheses that governance influences the gains obtained from cross-listing. Specifically, (a) 
cross-listed firms from strong governance countries have higher Tobin’s Qs than cross-listed 
firms from weak governance countries, and (b) cross-listed firms from strong governance 
countries have higher Tobin’s Qs than non-cross-listed firms.  
- Insert Table 10 about Here - 
Overall, our findings complement the previous literature on the benefits of cross-listings 
on U.S. markets but also deepen the literature in several ways. First, by considering different 
facets of governance at the country and minority shareholder level we manage to reconcile the 
legal bonding hypothesis (Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999) and market segmentation hypothesis 
(Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Miller, 1999). Second, we account for variations in these 
governance dimensions over time to show that there are ongoing adverse valuation effects after 
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cross-listing for firms from weak governance countries. The extant literature has established a 
valuation gain around the cross-listing (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Miller, 1999) but little is 
known about the longer-term valuation impacts and the roles played by different governance 
dimensions. Third, we examine the firm valuation effects of a credit rating agency’s sovereign 
credit ratings for cross-listed stocks and add to the literature on market segmentation that 
improved sovereign credit ratings help cross-listed firms to lower their costs of capital.  
4.4 Additional Robustness Tests 
In addition to the Heckman selection models and propensity score matching (PSM), we 
also perform the following robustness checks and find the results are consistent.  First, we find 
the untabulated results hold for various forms of clustering by firm, or by 2, 3, or 4 digit SIC 
codes and hold with or without year dummies. The results are also not driven by the Asian 
financial crisis the tech-boom in the US, and robust after excluding the observations in 1997 or 
excluding the period between 1999-2001.Second, the results are robust to collinearity. The VIF 
for the variables does not exceed two, suggesting that collinearity is not a live issue in our 
analyses. Nonetheless, we still use principal component analysis to condense the variables into 
orthogonal components, which should not be collinear. The principal components analysis 
retains only components whose eigenvalue is at least one. This yields five components in total. 
Three principal components, denoted HomeComp1-Homecomp3, represent home country 
variables. Two principal components, denoted FirmComp1- FirmComp2, represent firm-level 
variables. The untabulated results are consistent in these models. We also address the concerns 
that the ADRI variable is highly correlated with the governance variables by dropping the ADRI 
variable, and find the results are consistent (untabulated). Finally, to address the concern that 
some firm-level control variables might be endogenous with performance, we replace the firm-
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level controls with the average value for the firm’s country and year by following Masulis et al. 
(2007), and the results remain consistent.  
5 Conclusions 
 
This paper highlights the importance of home-country sovereign-governance. The 
bonding hypothesis implies that firms from poor shareholder-governance countries can signal 
their quality by listing in the US and binding themselves to the US’s strong shareholder-rules. 
However, it is not clear why this bonding would ameliorate poor sovereign-governance in the 
form of corruption, ineffective regulation, or expropriation.  
We distinguish shareholder-governance with sovereign-governance and examine their 
impact on value of foreign stocks that list in the US. We show that home-country sovereign 
governance, but not shareholder-governance, drives the valuations of cross-listed stocks in the 
US. This supports the bonding hypothesis, and indicates that it is necessary to distinguish 
between the myriad aspects of regulation and governance. We also show that firms from strong 
governance countries gain more benefits in valuations from cross-listing than do firms from 
weak governance countries.  
The main contribution of our study is in emphasizing the need to distinguish between the 
multi-dimensional aspects of sovereign and corporate governance. In doing so, we show that 
home-country sovereign governance influences the valuations of non-US companies that list in 
the US. Collateral contributions are to (a) provide additional support for the bonding hypothesis, 
(b) highlight the importance of using time-varying measures of governance, such as the World 
Bank’s, ICRG’s, and S&P sovereign rating measures, and (c) show that SOX imposed significant 
costs on non-US companies, especially those from strong governance environments.  
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Our study is not without its limitations. We do not examine the potential differences that 
firm and country level governance at home may provide for different types of stocks such as 
growth vs. value stocks. This is potentially interesting as better growth opportunities at the firm-
level may allow some cross-listed firms to over-ride the hampering effects of poor sovereign 
governance and still enhance their valuations. In another direction, the effect of sovereign 
governance on investors’ preferences on the trading location of cross-listed firms is also worth 
examining. Better sovereign governance at home, may increase investor demand to trade the 
cross-listed firm’s domestic stocks, thereby enhancing the firm’s market value. We leave these 
issues for future research. 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables 
Tobin’ Qt The firm’s Tobin’s Q in year t. The Tobin’s Q is the firm’s market value of 
assets divided by its book value of assets. The market value of assets is the 
market capitalization at the end of year t plus the book assets less the book 
value of equity. In Compustat codes this is (𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑐_𝑓 ∗ 𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑜 –  𝑐𝑒𝑞 +  𝑎𝑡)/𝑎𝑡 
Governance Variables 
WB Accountability A score between 0 and 1 that represents government accountability. A higher 
score indicates better accountability. Source: World Bank.  
WB Corruption A score between 0 and 1 that represents government corruption. A higher 
score indicates less corruption. Source: World Bank. 
WB Gov Effectiveness A score between 0 and 1 that represents government effectiveness. A higher 
score indicates greater effectiveness. Source: World Bank. 
WB Pol Stability A score between 0 and 1 that represents government stability. A higher score 
indicates a more stable political environment. Source: World Bank. 
WB Regulation  A score between 0 and 1 that represents government regulation. A higher 
score indicates more effective regulatory bodies. Source: World Bank. 
WB Rule of Law A score between 0 and 1 that represents rule of law. A higher score indicates 
better enforcement of rule of law ideals. Source: World Bank. 
WB Gov Index The average of the six World Bank governance variables (Accountability, 
Corruption, Effectiveness, Stability, Regulation, RuleOfLaw) 
ADRI (Spamann) The antidirector’s rights (originally from La Porta et al., 1998, and updated by 
Spamann, 2010) 
ICRG Composite The average ICRG composite governance index for the firm's home country 
over the year. Source: ICRG. This is an equal-weighted average of the 
individual financial, economic and political risk ratings. 
ICRG Financial The Financial stability and quality of the home country in year t as reported 
by the ICRG.  
ICRG Economic The Economic stability and quality of the home country in year t as reported 
by the ICRG.  
ICRG Political The Political stability and quality of the home country in year t as reported by 
the ICRG.  
S&P Rating The S&P sovereign credit ratings. S&P provides ordinal credit ratings ranging 
from AAA to Default/Selective Default for sovereign obligors.  We first 
transform the ratings into a linear scale between 0 and 20 and then we convert 
those into a score between 0 and 1 by dividing by 20.  
Control Variables 
IAOP The industry adjusted operating performance in year t. The operating 
performance is the operating cash flow before depreciation (Compustat code: 
oibdp) divided by its total assets (Compustat code at). The industry adjusted 
operating performance is the operating performance less the mean operating 
performance for all compustat companies in that firm’s industry and year.  
Ln(Assets) The natural log of the firm’s total assets (Compustat code: at) in year t.  
DPS The dividends per share (Compustat code: dvpsp_f). This is the dividends 
paid divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year.  
Cash/Assets The firm's cash (Compustat code: ch) divided by its total assets (Compustat 
code: at).  
Leverage The firm's leverage, defined as its total long term debt (Compustat code: dltt) 
divided by its total assets (Compustat code: at).  
  
Country Level Variables 
Home Region Return The equally weighted average stock return earned in the firm’s home region. 
The region is the regional group of the firm’s home country as defined by the 
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United Nations (here: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm)  
CPI The home country’s CPI in year 𝑡 as reported by the World Bank 
Trade Imbalance The home country's import-export imbalance. It is (imports - 
exports)/(imports + exports). Source: World Bank. 
FDI/GDP The amount of foreign direct investment in the home country scaled by the 
home country’s GDP. Source: World Bank. 
Home Market Cap/GDP The market capitalization of all firms listed in the home market divided by the 
home market's GDP. Source: World Bank. 
Home Market Turnover The turnover of all stocks in the home market. Source: World Bank. 
Home Corporate Tax Rate The highest corporate tax rate for firms paying tax in the home country. 
Source: World Bank. 
Heckman Control Variables 
ADRI (Spamann) The Spamann (2010) Anti-director rights index (ADRI)   
Governance (Yr 1) The value of the governance variable in the year of the cross-listing. This is 
variously the issue-year value of ‘accountability’, ‘corruption’, 
‘effectiveness’, ‘stability’, ‘regulation’, ‘law’, ‘GovIndex’, or ‘SapRating’.  
Home Market Return (Yr 1) The equally weighted average stock return earned in the firm’s home region in 
the year of the cross-listing. The region is the regional group of the firm’s 
home country as defined by the United Nations (here: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm) 
High Tech Dummy  An indicator that equals one if the firm is a high-tech firm as defined in 
Loughran and Ritter (2002). They define a high-tech firm as one that operates 
in the following industries: computer hardware (SIC codes: 3571, 3572, 3575, 
3577, 3578); communications equipment (3661, 3663, 3669); electronics 
(3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679); navigation equipment (3812); 
measuring and controlling devices (3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829); medical 
instruments (3841, 3845); telephone equipment (4812, 4813); 
communications services (4899); and software (7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 
7375, 7378, 7379) 
Fixed Price IPO An indicator that equals one if SDC reports the firm used a fixed price pricing 
mechanism. 
VC Involvement An indicator that equals one if the firm is backed by venture capital. 
Firm Commitment IPO An indicator that equals one if the firm uses a firm commitment underwriting 
mechanism.  
Trade Imbalance (Yr 1) The home country's import-export imbalance in the year of the issue. It is 
(imports - exports)/(imports + exports). Source: World Bank. 
FDI/GDP (Yr 1) The amount of foreign direct investment in the home country scaled by the 
home country's GDP in the year of the issue. Source: World Bank. 
Home Market Cap/GDP (yr1) The market capitalization of all firms listed in the home market divided by the 
home market's GDP in the year of the issue. Source: World Bank. 
Home Market Turnover (yr1) The turnover of all stocks in the home market in the year of the listing. 
Source: World Bank. 
Ln(Assets) (year 1) The natural log of the firms’ assets in the year of listing as reported by SDC.  
Home Corporate Tax Rate The maximum corporate tax rate in the home country. 
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 Table 2: Summary statistics by year 
 
Year Observations Accountability Corruption Effectiveness Political 
Stability 
Regulation Rule Of 
Law 
WB 
Gov 
Index 
S&P 
Rating 
ICRG 
Composite 
Index 
ICRG 
Financial 
Index 
ICRG 
Economic 
Index 
ICRG 
Political 
Index 
1996 437 0.803 0.882 0.892 0.703 0.840 0.876 0.833 0.869 0.810 0.445 0.385 0.789 
1997 535 0.804 0.879 0.888 0.700 0.843 0.874 0.831 0.870 0.818 0.424 0.394 0.816 
1998 568 0.806 0.859 0.868 0.711 0.870 0.851 0.828 0.856 0.796 0.383 0.403 0.806 
1999 590 0.805 0.858 0.866 0.709 0.866 0.848 0.825 0.851 0.783 0.384 0.392 0.791 
2000 602 0.816 0.864 0.872 0.720 0.869 0.852 0.832 0.853 0.800 0.383 0.415 0.802 
2001 671 0.810 0.863 0.872 0.717 0.866 0.852 0.830 0.853 0.807 0.388 0.406 0.820 
2002 663 0.796 0.842 0.864 0.698 0.836 0.829 0.811 0.852 0.796 0.390 0.400 0.803 
2003 657 0.801 0.849 0.868 0.659 0.839 0.830 0.807 0.856 0.804 0.404 0.400 0.805 
2004 639 0.825 0.836 0.870 0.647 0.845 0.832 0.809 0.863 0.815 0.412 0.412 0.805 
2005 620 0.795 0.818 0.857 0.635 0.831 0.817 0.792 0.862 0.808 0.408 0.410 0.799 
2006 634 0.772 0.816 0.858 0.629 0.827 0.813 0.786 0.867 0.805 0.409 0.415 0.787 
2007 585 0.742 0.786 0.840 0.615 0.813 0.789 0.764 0.862 0.805 0.409 0.420 0.782 
2008 579 0.694 0.764 0.833 0.578 0.799 0.764 0.739 0.861 0.794 0.411 0.409 0.768 
Total 7,780 0.790 0.839 0.865 0.670 0.842 0.832 0.806 0.859 0.803 0.403 0.405 0.798 
 
Note: This table presents the sample composition by year for cross-listed firms in the US.  Column 2 reports the number of observations. Columns 3-14 contain the average values 
of the various governance variables.  Variables are as defined in Table 1. 
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Table 3: Tobin's Q and governance by country 
 
Country Code Country Number Tobin’s 
Q 
Accountability Corruption Effectiveness Political 
Stability 
Regulation Rule Of 
Law 
WB 
Gov 
Index 
S&P 
Rating 
ICRG 
Composite 
Index 
ICRG 
Financial 
Index 
ICRG 
Economic 
Index 
ICRG 
Political 
Index 
English Legal Origin 
AUS AUSTRALIA 192 2.10 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.87 0.94 0.96 0.93 0.96 0.82 0.36 0.41 0.87 
BLZ BELIZE 6 0.88 0.74 0.51 0.60 0.60 0.52 0.55 0.59 0.37 . . . . 
CAN CANADA 2,098 2.01 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.86 0.92 0.95 0.93 0.98 0.85 0.41 0.42 0.87 
GHA GHANA 6 1.15 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.39 0.48 0.46 0.45 . 0.60 0.29 0.28 0.64 
HKG HONG KONG 270 1.34 0.56 0.89 0.89 0.76 0.98 0.86 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.44 0.43 0.77 
IND INDIA 81 2.69 0.59 0.46 0.54 0.19 0.45 0.57 0.47 0.49 0.69 0.43 0.35 0.61 
IRL IRELAND 127 1.90 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.97 0.86 0.41 0.43 0.89 
ISR ISRAEL 838 1.76 0.68 0.83 0.84 0.14 0.82 0.79 0.68 0.71 0.70 0.39 0.39 0.62 
NZL NEW ZEALAND 42 1.60 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.80 0.33 0.40 0.88 
PNG PAPUA NEW GUINEA 5 1.99 0.45 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.17 0.26 0.30 0.64 0.38 0.34 0.56 
SGP SINGAPORE 54 1.33 0.47 0.98 0.99 0.90 0.99 0.93 0.88 1.00 0.89 0.45 0.47 0.86 
ZAF SOUTH AFRICA 109 1.82 0.72 0.69 0.77 0.33 0.63 0.57 0.62 0.57 0.71 0.38 0.36 0.69 
THA THAILAND 5 1.30 0.62 0.52 0.61 0.59 0.60 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.72 0.37 0.36 0.71 
GBR UNITED KINGDOM 783 2.10 0.89 0.96 0.95 0.73 0.98 0.94 0.91 1.00 0.82 0.39 0.39 0.86 
French Legal Origin 
ARG ARGENTINA 126 1.30 0.57 0.45 0.56 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.48 0.26 0.69 0.32 0.38 0.69 
BEL BELGIUM 21 2.32 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.81 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.95 0.82 0.40 0.43 0.82 
BRA BRAZIL 72 1.39 0.58 0.56 0.55 0.40 0.58 0.45 0.52 0.41 0.67 0.33 0.35 0.66 
CHL CHILE 217 1.44 0.76 0.89 0.86 0.68 0.92 0.87 0.83 0.72 0.78 0.38 0.40 0.78 
COL COLOMBIA 4 1.07 0.35 0.31 0.52 0.10 0.60 0.24 0.35 0.55 0.59 0.35 0.31 0.51 
FRA FRANCE 266 1.80 0.86 0.90 0.90 0.72 0.83 0.90 0.85 1.00 0.79 0.39 0.41 0.79 
GRC GREECE 84 1.26 0.77 0.67 0.74 0.62 0.76 0.74 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.34 0.37 0.77 
IDN INDONESIA 42 1.64 0.31 0.20 0.39 0.12 0.40 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.61 0.35 0.33 0.53 
ITA ITALY 136 1.49 0.79 0.72 0.78 0.67 0.77 0.74 0.75 0.88 0.80 0.40 0.40 0.80 
JOR JORDAN 3 1.41 0.39 0.59 0.58 0.40 0.66 0.63 0.54 0.40 0.73 0.38 0.37 0.71 
LUX LUXEMBOURG 83 1.69 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.91 0.43 0.45 0.93 
MEX MEXICO 256 1.47 0.51 0.45 0.62 0.33 0.66 0.39 0.49 0.53 0.72 0.38 0.36 0.70 
NLD NETHERLANDS 317 1.92 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.91 0.98 0.95 0.96 1.00 0.86 0.40 0.42 0.90 
PAN PANAMA 28 1.22 0.63 0.43 0.58 0.50 0.68 0.50 0.55 0.47 0.73 0.35 0.37 0.73 
PER PERU 29 1.90 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.20 0.63 0.31 0.42 0.44 0.69 0.38 0.37 0.63 
PHL PHILIPPINES 25 1.29 0.52 0.35 0.53 0.23 0.56 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.70 0.37 0.37 0.66 
PRT PORTUGAL 25 1.30 0.91 0.87 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.80 0.36 0.37 0.87 
ESP SPAIN 84 1.45 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.61 0.87 0.87 0.83 0.95 0.79 0.39 0.40 0.80 
TUR TURKEY 8 2.33 0.42 0.53 0.61 0.23 0.58 0.54 0.49 0.35 0.62 0.31 0.30 0.63 
VEN VENEZUELA 14 0.98 0.45 0.20 0.26 0.23 0.33 0.22 0.28 0.30 0.65 0.39 0.32 0.59 
German Legal Origin 
AUT AUSTRIA 6 1.50 0.92 0.95 0.94 0.87 0.93 0.97 0.93 1.00 0.85 0.42 0.40 0.88 
DEU GERMANY 161 1.63 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.83 0.92 0.94 0.91 1.00 . . . . 
JPN JAPAN 331 1.44 0.77 0.86 0.87 0.85 0.77 0.89 0.83 0.92 0.85 0.47 0.40 0.83 
CHE SWITZERLAND 110 2.18 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.90 0.46 0.44 0.89 
Scandinavian Legal Origin 
DNK DENMARK 40 2.20 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.89 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.87 0.42 0.43 0.89 
FIN FINLAND 48 1.93 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.88 0.38 0.45 0.92 
ISL ICELAND 8 2.68 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.93 1.00 0.98 0.81 0.80 0.31 0.38 0.91 
NOR NORWAY 58 1.38 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.89 0.99 0.96 1.00 0.91 0.47 0.47 0.88 
SWE SWEDEN 105 1.95 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.92 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.85 0.37 0.43 0.89 
Socialist Legal Origin 
CHN CHINA 394 1.84 0.07 0.40 0.59 0.36 0.43 0.43 0.38 0.70 0.77 0.46 0.40 0.68 
HUN HUNGARY 11 1.73 0.85 0.74 0.79 0.76 0.84 0.75 0.79 0.66 0.75 0.36 0.35 0.80 
KAZ KAZAKHSTAN 2 1.05 0.18 0.18 0.36 0.60 0.37 0.24 0.32 0.58 . . . . 
POL POLAND 2 1.20 0.82 0.70 0.73 0.59 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.63 0.75 0.38 0.35 0.77 
RUS RUSSIA 48 1.92 0.29 0.21 0.42 0.22 0.34 0.19 0.28 0.45 . . . . 
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Table 4: Univariate statistics 
 
 All Bad Governance Good Governance Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)=(2)-(3) 
Tobin’s Q 1.8210*** 1.7529*** 1.8412*** -0.0883*** 
WB Accountability 0.7902*** 0.4771*** 0.8829*** -0.4058*** 
WB Corruption 0.8388*** 0.5581*** 0.9219*** -0.3638*** 
WB Gov Effectiveness 0.8647*** 0.6513*** 0.9279*** -0.2767*** 
WB Pol Stability 0.6702*** 0.2916*** 0.7824*** -0.4908*** 
WB Regulation 0.8421*** 0.6043*** 0.9125*** -0.3083*** 
WB Rule of Law 0.8317*** 0.5402*** 0.9181*** -0.3779*** 
WB Gov Index 0.8063*** 0.5204*** 0.8910*** -0.3705*** 
S&P Rating 0.8592*** 0.5824*** 0.9408*** -0.3584*** 
ICRG Composite 0.8029*** 0.7143*** 0.8291*** -0.1147*** 
ICRG Financial 0.4027*** 0.3947*** 0.4051*** -0.0104*** 
ICRG Economic 0.4052*** 0.3739*** 0.4144*** -0.0405*** 
ICRG Political 0.7982*** 0.6603*** 0.8388*** -0.1785*** 
Home Region Stock Return 0.1450*** 0.2268*** 0.1208*** 0.1060*** 
Tobin’s Q (t-1) 2.2537*** 2.2032*** 2.2686*** -0.0654*** 
CPI 0.0300*** 0.0596*** 0.0213*** 0.0383*** 
IAOP (t-1) 0.0374*** 0.0612*** 0.0303*** 0.0309*** 
Ln(Assets (t-1) 6.8582*** 6.3239*** 7.0165*** -0.6925*** 
DPS (t-1) 0.4059*** 0.3128*** 0.4335*** -0.1207*** 
Cash/Assets (t-1) 0.1374*** 0.1557*** 0.1319*** 0.0238*** 
Debt/Assets (t-1) 0.1547*** 0.1303*** 0.1619*** -0.0316*** 
Trade Imbalance -0.0261*** -0.0172*** -0.0288*** 0.0116*** 
FDI/GDP 0.0006*** 0.0003*** 0.0008*** -0.0005*** 
Home Market Cap/GDP 0.0103*** 0.0060*** 0.0116*** -0.0056*** 
Home Market Turnover 0.7559*** 0.6085*** 0.7991*** -0.1906*** 
Home Corp Tax Rate 0.3308*** 0.3346*** 0.3297*** 0.0049*** 
 
Note: This table reports the univariate statistics. Column 1 contains univariate statistics for the full sample of 7780 observations. 
Column 2 analyzes firms that cross-listed to the US from poor-governance countries. A country is a poor-governance country in year t 
if its WB Gov Index in year t falls within the bottom 25% of all firms in that year. Column 3 contains results for firms from good 
governance countries, defined as the complement of poor-governance countries. Column 4 contains the difference between Column 2 
and Column 3. Variables are as defined in Table 1. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Difference in means test by cross-listing status 
 
Variable Cross-Listed Not Cross-Listed Difference 
  [1] [2] [3]=[1]-[2] 
Tobin’s Q 1.823 1.424 0.399*** 
WB Accountability 0.791 0.751 0.040*** 
WB Corruption 0.839 0.854 -0.015*** 
WB Gov Effectiveness 0.865 0.875 -0.010*** 
WB Pol Stability 0.670 0.772 -0.103*** 
WB Regulation 0.841 0.833 0.008*** 
WB Rule of Law 0.832 0.862 -0.030*** 
WB Gov Index 0.806 0.825 -0.018*** 
ICRG Composite 0.802 0.825 -0.023*** 
S&P Rating 0.860 0.886 -0.026*** 
Note: This table contains difference in means test for the cross-listed sample and non-cross-listed sample. The superscript *** in Column 3 denotes significance at 1% in a 
difference in means test. 
 
 
Table 6: Bivariate statistics for Tobin’s Q by cross-listing status and governance 
 
 Variable Cross-listed Not Cross-listed Difference 
    [1] [2] [3]=[1]-[2] 
[A] Strong governance 1.896*** 1.374*** 0.521*** 
[B] Weak Governance 1.668*** 1.663*** 0.004 
[C] = [A]- [B] Difference 0.228*** -0.289*** 0.517*** 
Note: This table contains statistics for Tobin’s Q for firms cross-listed/non-cross-listed and/or from a strong/weak governance country. We define a strong governance country as 
one for which the World Bank governance index is above 0.8 and a weak governance country as one for which the governance index is below 0.8 (marking the cut-off for the 
bottom 25% of the sample). Superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively using a t-test, or difference in means test (as appropriate), or, 
for the difference-in-differences figure, a regression of the form:  
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐼�Cross-listed�𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐼(Strong Governance)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃 �𝐼(Strong Governance)𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐼�Cross-listed�� + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
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 Table 7: OLS Regressions for Tobin’s Q 
 
Dependent Variable Tobin's Q 
Technique OLS, Year Dummies , Firm Clustering 
Governance Variable WB  
Accountability 
WB 
Corruption 
WB Gov 
Effectiveness 
WB Pol 
Stability 
WB 
Regulation 
WB Rule  
of Law 
WB Gov 
Index 
ICRG  
Composite 
S&P 
Rating 
ADRI (Spamann) 0.019 0.025 0.036 0.019 0.043 0.028 0.016 0.038 0.029 
 [0.531] [0.423] [0.229] [0.527] [0.153] [0.371] [0.601] [0.203] [0.337] 
Governance Variable 1.222*** 1.096*** 1.472*** 0.604*** 1.317*** 0.958*** 1.396*** 2.815*** 0.986*** 
 [0.000] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.003] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
I(SOX) 0.157 0.474 0.758* 0.054 0.683* 0.371 0.481* 0.355 0.278 
 [0.429] [0.119] [0.058] [0.644] [0.075] [0.129] [0.079] [0.496] [0.210] 
I(SOX) x Governance Variable -0.375 -0.709** -1.038** -0.260* -0.932** -0.589** -0.743** -0.894 -0.499* 
 [0.129] [0.044] [0.025] [0.086] [0.035] [0.040] [0.026] [0.160] [0.054] 
Region Market Return -0.008 -0.146 -0.129 -0.109 -0.15 -0.161* -0.059 -0.089 -0.076 
 [0.938] [0.132] [0.188] [0.286] [0.117] [0.099] [0.556] [0.389] [0.439] 
Tobin’s Q (t-1) 0.158*** 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.159*** 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.157*** 0.160*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
CPI 2.120*** 2.683*** 2.463*** 2.067*** 2.441*** 2.644*** 2.820*** 2.945*** 2.804*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
IAOP (t-1) 0.535*** 0.534*** 0.534*** 0.540*** 0.535*** 0.531*** 0.538*** 0.525*** 0.536*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ln(Assets) (t-1) -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.080*** -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.082*** -0.075*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
DPS (t-1) 0.038** 0.038** 0.040** 0.046** 0.038** 0.040** 0.040** 0.052** 0.041** 
 [0.044] [0.050] [0.041] [0.019] [0.050] [0.043] [0.039] [0.011] [0.032] 
Cash/Assets (t-1) 0.927*** 0.875*** 0.876*** 0.895*** 0.892*** 0.875*** 0.891*** 0.895*** 0.857*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Debt/Assets (t-1) -0.188 -0.135 -0.145 -0.158 -0.143 -0.137 -0.172 -0.157 -0.147 
 [0.186] [0.333] [0.300] [0.271] [0.306] [0.330] [0.225] [0.273] [0.295] 
Trade Imbalance 0.566* 0.273 0.306 0.644* 0.114 0.254 0.525* 0.852** 0.243 
 [0.067] [0.386] [0.336] [0.052] [0.715] [0.424] [0.097] [0.012] [0.447] 
FDI/GDP -73.281** -101.746** -105.460** -103.095*** -107.688** -94.001** -101.994** -95.864** -94.013** 
 [0.038] [0.013] [0.011] [0.010] [0.014] [0.019] [0.010] [0.019] [0.016] 
Home Market Cap/GDP 2.663 2.339 1.243 0.228 1.72 2.583 0.156 -2.183 1.049 
 [0.459] [0.523] [0.736] [0.952] [0.647] [0.479] [0.966] [0.570] [0.778] 
Home Market Turnover 0.081 0.152*** 0.150*** 0.146*** 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.113** 0.131** 0.113** 
 [0.127] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.040] [0.017] [0.042] 
Home Corp Tax Rate -0.186 0.269 0.167 0.174 0.461 0.25 0.133 0.107 0.051 
 [0.565] [0.380] [0.587] [0.582] [0.143] [0.417] [0.669] [0.747] [0.873] 
Constant 0.971*** 0.847** 0.525 1.531*** 0.518 0.984*** 0.743** -0.806 1.052*** 
 [0.000] [0.011] [0.208] [0.000] [0.230] [0.001] [0.016] [0.113] [0.000] 
Observations 5,642 5,642 5,642 5,642 5,642 5,642 5,642 5,493 5,642 
R2 37.40% 36.80% 36.80% 36.90% 36.80% 36.80% 37.10% 37.20% 37.00% 
F test 36.84 36.57 37.09 35.86 37.44 35.99 36.71 35.92 36.27 
 
Note: This table presents OLS regression results for Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable as per equation (1).  The independent 
variables are defined in Table 1.  The models include year dummy variables, and standard errors are clustered by firm.  *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Robustness Checks: Heckman Regressions 
 
Dependent Variable Tobin's Q 
Governance Variable WB  
Accountability 
WB 
Corruption 
WB Gov 
Effectiveness 
WB Pol 
Stability 
WB 
Regulation 
WB Rule  
of Law 
WB Gov 
Index 
S&P 
Rating 
ICRG 
Composite 
I(SOX) -0.211 0.028 0.281 -0.097 0.113 0.074 0.092 0.044 -0.122 
 [0.267] [0.888] [0.246] [0.443] [0.637] [0.693] [0.644] [0.812] [0.760] 
Governance Variable 0.945*** 0.737*** 1.001*** 0.521*** 0.877*** 0.707*** 1.037*** 0.860*** 2.075*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
I(SOX) x Governance Variable 0.085 -0.287 -0.587** -0.079 -0.383 -0.341* -0.311 -0.284 -0.052 
 [0.683] [0.170] [0.022] [0.518] [0.135] [0.080] [0.145] [0.121] [0.915] 
ADRI (Spamann) 0.014 0.011 0.023 0.004 0.025 0.016 0.008 0.009 0.024 
 [0.536] [0.633] [0.319] [0.855] [0.278] [0.498] [0.722] [0.692] [0.311] 
Region Stock Return  -0.016 -0.181 -0.171 -0.095 -0.173 -0.188 -0.08 -0.061 -0.105 
 [0.897] [0.131] [0.155] [0.429] [0.150] [0.116] [0.509] [0.622] [0.383] 
Tobin’s Q (t-1) 2.287*** 2.274*** 2.080*** 2.200*** 2.169*** 2.289*** 2.630*** 2.935*** 2.988*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
IAOP (t-1) 0.173** 0.166** 0.164** 0.174** 0.167** 0.162** 0.172** 0.173** 0.142* 
 [0.019] [0.025] [0.026] [0.018] [0.024] [0.028] [0.020] [0.020] [0.059] 
Ln(Assets) (t-1) -0.071*** -0.074*** -0.075*** -0.083*** -0.073*** -0.075*** -0.074*** -0.079*** -0.080*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
DPS (t-1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.850] [0.828] [0.806] [0.718] [0.830] [0.812] [0.815] [0.799] [0.710] 
Cash/Assets (t-1) 1.952*** 1.918*** 1.923*** 1.906*** 1.932*** 1.918*** 1.923*** 1.896*** 1.955*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Debt/Assets  (t-1) -0.175* -0.14 -0.150* -0.170* -0.137 -0.144 -0.170* -0.132 -0.138 
 [0.053] [0.123] [0.100] [0.061] [0.132] [0.113] [0.060] [0.152] [0.130] 
Trade Imbalance 0.178 -0.157 -0.116 0.26 -0.299 -0.158 0.102 -0.137 0.226 
 [0.494] [0.541] [0.653] [0.338] [0.230] [0.536] [0.696] [0.597] [0.421] 
FDI/GDP -54.635 -80.328** -83.077** -81.256** -84.954** -73.655** -81.008** -80.405** -82.370** 
 [0.115] [0.021] [0.017] [0.020] [0.015] [0.033] [0.020] [0.022] [0.019] 
Home Market Cap/GDP 15.667*** 16.006*** 14.930*** 15.140*** 15.848*** 16.278*** 13.786*** 15.436*** 12.999*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Home market Turnover 0.088** 0.169*** 0.171*** 0.154*** 0.169*** 0.161*** 0.124*** 0.138*** 0.155*** 
 [0.049] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.006] [0.003] [0.001] 
Home Corp Tax Rate 0.428 0.755*** 0.640** 0.644** 0.904*** 0.711*** 0.648** 0.577** 0.588** 
 [0.124] [0.005] [0.018] [0.017] [0.001] [0.008] [0.017] [0.038] [0.035] 
High Tech Dummy 0.235*** 0.188*** 0.185*** 0.227*** 0.195*** 0.184*** 0.206*** 0.205*** 0.223*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 0.534*** 0.533** 0.315 0.971*** 0.298 0.573*** 0.417** 0.556*** -0.419 
 [0.005] [0.011] [0.195] [0.000] [0.243] [0.005] [0.043] [0.003] [0.269] 
Selection Regression  
I(SOX) -0.183*** -0.200*** -0.197*** -0.212*** -0.201*** -0.198*** -0.194*** -0.175*** -0.191*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ADRI (Spamann) -0.350*** -0.347*** -0.344*** -0.278*** -0.350*** -0.337*** -0.335*** -0.330*** -0.319*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Governance Variable (Year 1) -0.544*** -0.003 -0.254** -1.299*** -0.246** -0.484*** -0.819*** -1.128*** -2.869*** 
 [0.000] [0.977] [0.037] [0.000] [0.046] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Region Return (Year 1) 0.135** 0.170*** 0.160*** 0.051 0.153*** 0.146*** 0.119** 0.136*** 0.119** 
 [0.011] [0.002] [0.003] [0.337] [0.005] [0.006] [0.025] [0.010] [0.026] 
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High Tech 0.529*** 0.546*** 0.546*** 0.490*** 0.545*** 0.545*** 0.535*** 0.531*** 0.525*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Fixed Price IPO -2.070*** -2.019*** -2.028*** -2.132*** -2.028*** -2.044*** -2.070*** -2.041*** -2.025*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
VC Involvement 0.675*** 0.720*** 0.708*** 0.566*** 0.710*** 0.686*** 0.661*** 0.634*** 0.670*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Firm Commitment -0.716*** -0.723*** -0.722*** -0.700*** -0.723*** -0.719*** -0.717*** -0.729*** -0.737*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Trade Imbalance (Year 1) -1.212*** -0.924*** -1.000*** -2.568*** -0.914*** -1.092*** -1.303*** -1.516*** -1.856*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
FDI/GDP (Year 1) 248.058*** 268.059*** 263.821*** 250.692*** 267.572*** 253.467*** 251.765*** 237.456*** 259.682*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
MKTCAP/GDP (Year 1) -0.422 -3.389 -1.166 10.649*** -1.123 0.831 3.894 7.603*** 4.901* 
 [0.873] [0.230] [0.683] [0.000] [0.697] [0.763] [0.158] [0.005] [0.078] 
Home Turnover (Year 1) -0.338*** -0.415*** -0.400*** -0.277*** -0.399*** -0.382*** -0.346*** -0.310*** -0.315*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ln(Assets) (Year 1) 0.285*** 0.288*** 0.287*** 0.283*** 0.288*** 0.286*** 0.285*** 0.282*** 0.288*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Tax Rate 5.027*** 4.770*** 4.832*** 5.051*** 4.724*** 4.867*** 4.933*** 5.364*** 5.165*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant -1.177*** -1.526*** -1.352*** -1.019*** -1.309*** -1.200*** -0.993*** -0.914*** 0.435* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.065] 
lambda 0.135*** 0.146*** 0.144*** 0.131*** 0.147*** 0.140*** 0.137*** 0.138*** 0.133*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations 35,516 35,516 35,516 35,516 35,516 35,516 35,516 35,391 34,561 
Wald Stat 1230.95 1180.04 1180.27 1219.52 1182.27 1179.37 1203.2 1149.98 1192.93 
Rho 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 
 
Note: This table presents Heckman regression results for Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable in the second step, and the decision to cross-list is in the first step.  
The key independent variables reflect different dimensions of governance.  The models include year dummy variables and standard errors are clustered by firm.  
Variables are as defined in Table 1. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9: Governance and Benefits of Cross-listing 
Dependent Variable Tobin's Q 
Technique OLS, Year Dummies , Firm Clustering 
Governance Variable WB WB WB Gov WB Pol WB WB Rule WB Gov ICRG S&P 
Accountability Corruption Effectiveness Stability Regulation of Law Index Composite Rating 
ADRI (Spamann) 0.019 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.011 0.004 0.001 0.005 
 [0.223] [0.732] [0.605] [0.585] [0.732] [0.488] [0.812] [0.943] [0.731] 
Governance Variable 0.387*** -0.152 -0.514*** -0.391*** -0.074 -0.316*** -0.154 -2.054*** -0.345*** 
 [0.000] [0.173] [0.001] [0.000] [0.431] [0.009] [0.158] [0.000] [0.008] 
Governance x I(Cross-listed) 0.168 0.562 0.926* 0.490*** 0.386 0.468* 0.536 2.521*** 0.656** 
 [0.484] [0.125] [0.052] [0.003] [0.288] [0.073] [0.115] [0.003] [0.026] 
I(Cross-listed) -0.227 -0.563* -0.894** -0.449*** -0.409 -0.481** -0.524* -2.159*** -0.663** 
 [0.253] [0.078] [0.035] [0.000] [0.198] [0.033] [0.067] [0.002] [0.013] 
Region Market Return 0.332*** 0.253*** 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.259*** 0.223*** 0.253*** 0.156*** 0.240*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] 
Tobin’s Q (t-1) 0.537*** 0.538*** 0.537*** 0.537*** 0.538*** 0.537*** 0.538*** 0.535*** 0.535*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
CPI 0.000*** 0 0 -0.000** 0 0 0 -0.000*** -0.000* 
 [0.001] [0.700] [0.114] [0.017] [0.795] [0.120] [0.666] [0.000] [0.068] 
IAOP (t-1) -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ln(Assets) (t-1) 0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.007 
 [0.540] [0.657] [0.332] [0.701] [0.708] [0.519] [0.664] [0.424] [0.322] 
DPS (t-1) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
Cash/Assets (t-1) 0.610*** 0.583*** 0.572*** 0.599*** 0.582*** 0.584*** 0.587*** 0.601*** 0.574*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Debt/Assets (t-1) 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Trade Imbalance 0.390** 0.418** 0.291 0.113 0.435*** 0.360** 0.422** -0.213 0.419*** 
 [0.023] [0.013] [0.108] [0.539] [0.009] [0.037] [0.012] [0.352] [0.008] 
FDI/GDP -9.917 -25.168 -25.242 -17.298 -24.859 -25.413 -26.371* -18.282 -25.855 
 [0.544] [0.122] [0.116] [0.293] [0.127] [0.114] [0.100] [0.271] [0.108] 
Home Market Cap/GDP -5.939*** -4.508** -3.327* -3.114* -4.656** -3.807** -4.547** -2.08 -4.167** 
 [0.002] [0.016] [0.067] [0.074] [0.013] [0.034] [0.014] [0.222] [0.022] 
Home Market Turnover -0.049** -0.004 0.003 0.005 -0.005 0.008 -0.004 0.014 0.009 
 [0.035] [0.854] [0.884] [0.795] [0.809] [0.683] [0.847] [0.509] [0.673] 
Home Corp Tax Rate -1.613*** -1.496*** -1.518*** -1.424*** -1.476*** -1.512*** -1.481*** -1.460*** -1.495*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 0.652*** 1.100*** 1.430*** 1.192*** 1.022*** 1.217*** 1.100*** 2.621*** 1.492*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations 54,514 54,514 54,514 54,514 54,514 54,514 54,514 54,365 54,461 
R2 45.70% 45.60% 45.70% 45.70% 45.60% 45.60% 45.60% 45.80% 45.70% 
F test 403.04 348.23 336.08 346.24 352.01 343.38 349.55 336.42 337.29 
 
Note: This table contains regressions that expand the sample to include non-cross-listed companies. The regressions compare the Tobin’s Q of cross-listed 
companies versus that of non-cross-listed companies. The indicator I(Cross-listed) equals one if the firm is cross-listed. Variables are defined in Table 1. 
Brackets contain p-values and superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10: Robustness checks: Propensity score regressions 
Dependent Variable Tobin's Q 
Technique OLS, Year Dummies , Firm Clustering 
Governance Variable WB WB WB Gov WB Pol WB WB Rule WB Gov ICRG S&P 
Accountability Corruption Effectiveness Stability Regulation of Law Index Composite Rating 
ADRI (Spamann) 0.052 0.075** 0.065* 0.079** 0.066** 0.080** 0.067* 0.059* 0.054 
 [0.115] [0.037] [0.053] [0.034] [0.049] [0.029] [0.059] [0.063] [0.102] 
Governance Variable -0.97 -2.359* -3.653** -1.745** -3.148** -2.723** -2.771** -4.880* -2.237* 
 [0.296] [0.060] [0.016] [0.049] [0.031] [0.032] [0.045] [0.093] [0.059] 
Governance x I(Cross-listed) 1.502 2.248* 3.508** 1.726** 3.061** 2.572** 2.769** 5.373* 2.447** 
 [0.108] [0.066] [0.019] [0.048] [0.035] [0.039] [0.040] [0.059] [0.041] 
I(Cross-listed) -1.586** -2.234** -3.388** -1.690** -2.895** -2.547** -2.631** -4.829** -2.492** 
 [0.034] [0.034] [0.011] [0.018] [0.019] [0.020] [0.021] [0.044] [0.020] 
Region Market Return -0.222 -0.411** -0.459*** -0.390** -0.482*** -0.463*** -0.423** -0.325** -0.371** 
 [0.180] [0.016] [0.007] [0.016] [0.004] [0.005] [0.014] [0.047] [0.031] 
Tobin’s Q (t-1) 0.257*** 0.256*** 0.253*** 0.255*** 0.254*** 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.255*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
CPI 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 [0.001] [0.005] [0.000] [0.014] [0.000] [0.009] [0.002] [0.001] [0.006] 
IAOP (t-1) 0.502* 0.493* 0.491* 0.483* 0.494* 0.493* 0.495* 0.480* 0.490* 
 [0.058] [0.063] [0.060] [0.070] [0.059] [0.061] [0.060] [0.074] [0.064] 
Ln(Assets) (t-1) -0.096*** -0.108*** -0.110*** -0.100*** -0.113*** -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.103*** -0.104*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
DPS (t-1) 0.261*** 0.279*** 0.265*** 0.257*** 0.282*** 0.264*** 0.266*** 0.264*** 0.262*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Cash/Assets (t-1) 0.841*** 0.849*** 0.846*** 0.837*** 0.823*** 0.863*** 0.850*** 0.832*** 0.841*** 
 [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] 
Debt/Assets (t-1) -0.118 -0.042 -0.039 -0.07 -0.051 -0.042 -0.046 -0.077 -0.07 
 [0.375] [0.744] [0.766] [0.594] [0.693] [0.747] [0.725] [0.558] [0.586] 
Trade Imbalance -0.678 -1.260** -1.458** -1.321** -1.106* -1.340** -1.346** -1.249** -1.208** 
 [0.211] [0.025] [0.013] [0.017] [0.052] [0.018] [0.019] [0.030] [0.034] 
FDI/GDP -165.306*** -142.386*** -145.604*** -143.900*** -155.734*** -152.092*** -155.042*** -155.845*** -158.652*** 
 [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Home Market Cap/GDP 2.097 6.868 7.626 5.067 7.928 7.021 5.67 3.026 3.994 
 [0.722] [0.251] [0.225] [0.396] [0.188] [0.239] [0.350] [0.634] [0.506] 
Home Market Turnover -0.023 0.137* 0.164** 0.104 0.143* 0.151** 0.129* 0.097 0.08 
 [0.786] [0.070] [0.028] [0.158] [0.059] [0.043] [0.091] [0.223] [0.297] 
Home Corp Tax Rate -0.499 -0.363 -0.452 -0.267 -0.518 -0.34 -0.409 -0.413 -0.493 
 [0.238] [0.387] [0.278] [0.530] [0.218] [0.414] [0.329] [0.335] [0.248] 
Constant 2.795*** 3.714*** 4.965*** 3.027*** 4.510*** 4.021*** 4.081*** 5.324** 3.928*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.028] [0.001] 
Observations 6,513 6,513 6,513 6,513 6,513 6,513 6,513 6,391 6,513 
R2 37.50% 37.90% 38.00% 37.80% 37.90% 38.00% 37.90% 37.60% 37.80% 
F test 41.39 39.58 39.65 39.47 39.83 39.6 39.87 40.34 39.75 
Note: This table contains regressions that restrict the sample of non-cross-listed firms by using a propensity score approach. First, we run a model to predict 
whether a firm is ‘cross-listed’ based on the control variables in the model below. Second, we obtain the propensity scores from this logit model. Third, we 
generate a distribution of propensity scores for the set of firms that are cross-listed and find the score that marks the bottom 10% cut-off. Fourth, we exclude any 
non-cross-listed firm whose propensity score is below that cut-off. The reported models are OLS models that include year dummies and cluster standard errors by 
firm. Brackets contain p-values and superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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 1 Roosenboom and van Dijk (2009) also show that bonding creates value for firms choosing to cross-list on the 
London Stock Exchange. 
2 Doidge et al. (2004) do examine ‘common law’ versus ‘civil law’ countries; however, this does not capture the 
strength of the country’s regulatory environment and it is not clear that there is a bright-line distinction between 
common law and civil law countries.  
3 We note that Chung (2006) does examine some measures of home-country governance, but uses time-invariant 
measures dated from before the Asian Financial Crisis, does not update the variables for the financial crisis, and 
does not control for firm or country characteristics.  
4 We acknowledge the argument that the SEC may not fully enforce disclosure (Licht, 2003). However, (1)  the SEC 
appears relatively more efficient than the regulators in poor governance countries (Chen et al., 2005), and (2) even 
absent the SEC, shareholder class actions can be an effective disciplinary mechanism. 
5 The location of trade and price-discovery is a live issue (Halling et al., 2008; Cumming et al., 2011). However, it is 
clear that at least some price-discovery occurs in the U.S. (Halling et al., 2008). 
6 The data are available from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp  
7 The ICRG publishes a composite index that measures, for each month, a country's financial, economic and political 
risks. This paper uses the yearly average of the ICRG composite index. Papers using the ICRG governance measures 
include Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) and Bekaert et al. (2007) , among others. 
8 The main results vis-à-vis the governance variables hold whether or not we require the Spamann (2010) variable. 
They also hold if we replace it with the original ADRI score used in La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) or the Djankov et 
al. (2008) shareholder rights index.  
9 The results are robust to other measures of operating performance (return on assets, return on equity) and to 
subtracting the industry-median performance rather than the industry mean performance. The results are also robust 
to the use of SIC 2-digit or SIC 3-digit industry classifications.  Also, the results are robust to the definition of 
dividends per share, holding when using the dividends per share at the end of the last calendar year, and when 
defining the number of shares as either the number of common shares outstanding or the fully diluted number of 
shares outstanding. 
10   The paper adopts the United Nations geographic region definitions, available from: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm  
11 Loughran and Ritter (2004) define high tech firms as firms in the industries: computer hardware (SIC codes: 3571, 
3572, 3575, 3577, 3578); communications equipment (3661, 3663, 3669); electronics (3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 
3677, 3678, 3679); navigation equipment (3812); measuring and controlling devices (3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 
3829); medical instruments (3841, 3845); telephone equipment (4812, 4813); communications services (4899); and 
software (7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, 7379). 
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